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1. |
ANAO recommends that, in future circumstances where the Department of Finance and Deregulation is delivering capital works projects that depend upon Commonwealth owned and/or operated infrastructure, project governance arrangements be developed to manage the risk and cost of project construction and infrastructure decisions being made in isolation by: (a) developing a stronger leadership model that sets out the mutual obligations of each agency to coordinate decisions of critical importance associated with interdependent activities; and (b) adopting a sound approach to preparation and management of the overall project budget by comparing design milestone estimates of the cost of works to the overall budget and subsequently accounting for the final (out-turn) cost. Agreed response: Finance, DIAC, AGD and DITRDLG |
2. |
ANAO recommends that the Department of Finance and Deregulation informs the Public Works Committee of the project budget, the estimate of cost and order of accuracy on which the estimate is based when providing information to the Committee for projects it is delivering. Agreed response: Finance, DIAC, AGD and DITRDLG |
3. |
ANAO recommends that the Department of Finance and Deregulation, prior to committing funds to a major construction contract: (a) provide decision-makers with an assessment of any factors that may be reasonably expected to increase the overall cost to the Commonwealth, or reduce the scope or quality of the works; and (b) support spending authorisation and approval processes by advising decision-makers on the maximum amount that may become payable under the contract, as well as an assessment of the most likely cost. Agreed response: Finance, DIAC, AGD and DITRDLG |
4. |
ANAO recommends that the Department of Finance and Deregulation promote improved project delivery outcomes by: (a) providing decision-makers with a comprehensive assessment of risks and how they can be managed prior to making any significant departures from the planned project delivery strategy; and (b) implementing strategies aimed at promoting greater collaboration and teamwork between key consultants (including project managers, cost managers and designers) in working toward the established project objectives. Agreed response: Finance, DIAC, AGD and DITRDLG |
5. |
ANAO recommends that the Department of Finance and Deregulation require its key project management and other advisers to participate in a post-project review of major construction projects soon after they are completed so as to identify aspects and processes that have been particularly successful as well as those where lessons can be learned. Agreed response: Finance, DIAC, AGD and DITRDLG |
6. |
ANAO recommends that the Department of Finance and Deregulation: (a) when seeking additional funds for its capital works projects, develop budget breakdowns that clearly identify the elements that are proposed to be revised; and (b) explicitly recognise within its internal guidance material the requirement to report significant project changes, including to the budget, to the Public Works Committee. Agreed response: Finance, DIAC, AGD and DITRDLG |
8.16 The Committee held a public hearing on Wednesday 18 November 2009, with the following witnesses:
n Australian National Audit Office (ANAO);
n Attorney-General’s Department (AGD);
n Department of Finance and Deregulation (Finance); and
n Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC).
8.17 The Committee took evidence on the following issues:
n structural sustainability of the centre;
n transfer of responsibility for the project to Finance;
n unique nature of the project;
n cost estimates;
n overlapping of design and construction phases;
n post-implementation review; and
n protocols for whole-of-government contracts.
8.18 The Committee queried whether or not sufficient thought had been given to the structural sustainability and design of the centre considering the environmental conditions of the island. Although transport costs had placed constraints on both the choice of design and materials, Finance maintained that environmental factors such as salt, humidity and high rainfall had been taken into account with regard to the selection of materials.[15] Finance added that the facility had been designed to cope with seismic activity.
8.19 The ANAO report noted that in 2002 DIMIA and DOTARS were given responsibility for the original CIIDC project.[16] This decision was made to facilitate a ‘fast-track’ process whereby design and construction could proceed together.[17] After project estimates and the timeline escalated, the project was respecified, a more conventional delivery method adopted and responsibility for the project transferred to Finance.[18]
8.20 The Committee asked why the project had gone to DIMIA first instead of directly to Finance. The ANAO told the Committee that at the time it was not unusual for a department to take on responsibility for its own construction projects.[19] The ANAO understands that the increase in the estimated cost of the project and the extended timeframe led to the decision to transfer the responsibility to Finance ‘in an endeavour to provide greater cost certainty’.[20]
8.21 The ANAO report referred to the unique nature of the CIIDC project noting:
… the proposed purpose built permanent facility was recognised as being the first of its kind and, as such, there was no precedent upon which cost estimates could be accurately established.[21]
8.22 Finance reiterated this concept throughout the inquiry maintaining:
This project was unique in that it was the first purpose-designed and built Immigration Detention Centre in Australia, and as such there were no established benchmarks with which it could be compared.[22]
8.23 The Committee questioned the uniqueness of the project and the lack of benchmarks considering previous experience setting up and running the Baxter detention centre. DIAC explained that the CIIDC was unique in the sense that it had been designed as an immigration reception and processing centre rather than an immigration detention centre:
We take clients all the way through from reception to health, identity and security all within the centre premises. On the mainland we have different arrangements and that certainly makes it unique.[23]
8.24 The Committee queried why cost estimates could not have been more accurate for the project considering the expertise and experience available across Australia. Finance affirmed that it had drawn on professional consultants during the cost estimate process but maintained that the project still faced a unique set of circumstances:
The unique nature of this project was delivering a detention facility in the environmental conditions evident at Christmas Island. There was no basis upon which they could draw for estimating the sort of variance that you might get for delivering a complex project on Christmas Island. The order of accuracy that they can impart in those estimates is constrained by that lack of data.[24]
8.25 The Committee asked the Audit Office for its opinion on the estimates process and the resulting shortfall. The ANAO identified the budget as the problem rather than the estimates. The budget was insufficient:
From our perspective, the estimates for some time had been saying ‘You won’t be able to design and construct this project within the budget.’ So the estimates had a degree of accuracy to them. The budget was the problem. Trying to get it within budget was where the problems were arising.[25]
8.26 The ANAO added that the time frame caused further problems:
… because the time frames were so short, the department went to tender before its own strategy said it probably should have. Therefore you had a less mature design on which people were pricing, and that then led to further cost increases.[26]
8.27 With regard to the time frame, the ANAO noted that the design for the respecified project was to be prepared in four stages with a ‘hold point’ after each stage where design work would stop until DIMIA approved each stage.[27] This process would cause some delay during the design phase but would forestall more costly delays during the construction phase.[28] The ANAO found that this strategy had not been followed and this had directly contributed to the escalation of costs and time.[29]
8.28 The Committee questioned why Finance had abandoned the original delivery method and decide to overlap the design and construction phases of the project. Finance claimed that it was under time pressure from DIMIA to complete the facility and this had led to the decision.[30] The Committee asked for clarification as to the nature of those time pressures.
8.29 Finance reiterated that the pressure came from the urgency to complete the facility.[31] DIAC explained that pressure had been generated because the project was already well behind schedule when it was respecified and handed over to Finance to complete.[32] Under further questioning, DIAC confirmed that it had sufficient space in existing facilities to cope with demand and had not immediately utilised the CIIDC when it was completed.[33]
8.30 The ANAO noted the importance of a post-implementation review of construction projects to determine whether or not the project has achieved the expected business benefits.[34] Additionally the ANAO recommended that Finance conduct a post-project review to ‘identify aspects and processes that have been particularly successful as well as those where lessons can be learned’.[35]
8.31 The Committee noted that no post-implementation review of the CIIDC project had been conducted at the time of the audit and asked Finance if a ‘lessons learned’ review had been undertaken to determine what should or should not be done to ensure better outcomes for future construction projects. Finance told the Committee there had been no formal, lessons learned review of the CIIDC but that, as a direct result of the difficulties encountered with this project, the Department has introduced a two-stage Cabinet approval process[36], the Gateway Review[37] process and developed internal best practice guidelines.[38] These include a Post Occupancy Evaluation (POE) and a Lessons Learned workshop:
The purpose of the POE is to ensure that project is working as intended, and the users are operating the facility(ies) as expected. The Lessons Learned workshop aims to identify positive and negative project experiences and outcomes, with a view to improving future project outcomes. Process improvements that are identified through these activities are incorporated within the Better Practice Guide.[39]
Recommendation 13 |
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The Committee recommends that the Department of Finance and Deregulation (Finance) provide to the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) the results to date of the implementation of the Post Occupancy Evaluation process and the Lessons Learned workshops as soon as such information is available. |
8.32 The Committee is aware that the ANAO undertook a review of the initial implementation of the two-stage process and the Gateway Review process during Audit No. 20 2008-09 Approval of Funding for Public Works. The Committee understands that at that time the two processes had not been in operation for any length of time and it was difficult to determine their effectiveness in improving cost estimates and risk management of construction projects.
8.33 The Committee notes that an audit into the Administration of the Gateway Review Process is listed as a potential audit on the Audit Work Program for 2010-11. Considering the dependence being placed on the two-stage process and the Gateway Review process to mitigate risk in future Commonwealth construction projects the Committee recommends:
Recommendation 14 |
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The Committee recommends that the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) undertake an audit into the effectiveness of the implementation of the two-stage Cabinet approval process and the Gateway Review process in mitigating risk for Commonwealth construction projects since their introduction. |
8.34 The ANAO noted the difficulties experienced by the CIIDC project due to lack of leadership and coordination between the three agencies involved.[40] Despite a whole-of-project budget, decisions were taken by the three agencies independently leading to unacceptable budget overruns.[41] The ANAO recommends that in future governance arrangements be implemented for similar projects that provide a stronger leadership model, better coordination and milestones to track costs.[42]
8.35 The Committee asked what steps had been taken to implement this recommendation. Finance told the Committee that it has included lead agency arrangements in its Better Practice Guide that will be distributed to all its agencies.[43]
8.36 The Committee recognises that it is difficult at this distance to apportion blame but is gravely concerned at the mismanagement of Commonwealth funds for this project. The Committee is particularly concerned by the substantial discrepancy between the initial cost estimate and final cost of the project and apparent failure to identify significant risk factors in the project.
8.37 The Committee feels that more could have been done during the planning stage to develop a realistic estimate of the cost of the project and is not satisfied with the argument that the uniqueness of the project led to such serious miscalculation of costs and risks.
8.38 The Committee notes that Finance has taken positive steps to implement the two-stage approval process, the Gateway Review process and develop a Better Practice Guide to address the shortcomings identified throughout the design, planning and construction of the CIIDC. The Committee urges all government departments to ensure project governance arrangements and a strong leadership model are in place for whole-of-government contracts.